Corruption and the Security Sector
Recently, there has been a great deal of writing about the impact of corruption on security forces. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a work titled Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security (link here). On November 23, 2014, The New York Times published an article Graft Hobbles Iraq’s Military in Fighting ISIS By David D. Kirkpatrick. As article states:
“The Iraqi military and police forces had been so thoroughly pillaged by their own corrupt leadership that they all but collapsed this spring in the face of the advancing militants of the Islamic State — despite roughly $25 billion worth of American training and equipment over the past 10 years and far more from the Iraqi treasury.” Accordingly, in an effort to elevate yet another “victim” of corruption, often fed by US military and economic assistance, I invited James Cohen, who recently guest blogged here on Mapping Corruption to share his thoughts. As a reminder, James is an independent international development consultant based in Ottawa, Canada. He focuses on corruption, human security, and corporate social responsibility. He has experience with organizations such Transparency International UK and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. He can be followed on Twitter at @JamesCohen82 or contacted through LinkedIn. His comments first appeared on on the DCAF-ISSAT Community of Practice’ web-site.
I will preface that in my experience in the defense/security field I witnessed multiple examples of security forces purchasing products which were not needed for theater operations, on order to facilitate corruption. I also saw numerous cases of security services purchasing products at inflated prices, also in the context of using procurement spending as a vehicle for corruption. As the NYT article reported “Iraqi soldiers often charge that they have been furnished with partial supplies and cheaply made weapons because their commanders took kickbacks or skimmed off the savings.” As Transparency International states on its web-site “we estimate at least US$ 20 billion is lost to corruption in the (Defense) sector every year. And that is only a modest estimation of the costs incurred when national security concerns become a veil to hide corrupt activity. Single source contracts, unaccountable and overpaid agents, obscure defence budgets, unfair appointments and promotions, and many more forms of corruption in this secretive sector waste taxpayer funds and put citizens’ and soldiers’ lives at risk.”
I thank James again for today’s guest blog, so now to his work:
The Impact of Corruption on Security Sector Effectiveness
A string of recent global security failures has focused media and political attention on the impact of corruption on security sector operational effectiveness. Whereas corruption is often viewed by international actors as a costly annoyance with mostly local effects, there is increasing recognition of the significant risks it poses for both national and international security. In this post I highlight a couple of examples of how key international actors are beginning to take these risks more seriously and offer a few recommendations for effective anti-corruption programming within the context of security sector reform (SSR).
In 2012, poorly equipped Malian soldiers rapidly lost territory and morale to a wave of well-armed rebels and foreign fighters descending from the north. In 2013, Kenyan security forces failed to detect and prevent a major terrorist attack on the busy Westgate Shopping Center in Nairobi. In 2014, Nigerian security forces were unable to prevent the kidnapping of 300 schoolgirls, to track their abductors or to locate where they were being held captive. At the same time, the Iraqi army, trained and equipped at vast expense, was quickly overrun by the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In all of these cases, serious concerns have been raised about the role of corruption in ignoring or aiding the activities of extremists, in covering up their identities and whereabouts, and in diverting the resources that were intended to be used to fight them.
In response to these types of security failures, and the risks they pose to its citizens and allies, the US recently announced its new Security Governance Initiative (SGI), aimed at supporting security sector reform in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia. While much of the language to describe SGI focuses on strategic security threats, in particular to the US, emphasis is also placed on building accountable institutions and meeting citizen security needs, such as access to justice. While it is too early to tell whether this emphasis will prevail over more traditional ‘train and equip’ approaches, the recognition of the importance of governance and citizen-centered approaches is a step in the right direction in tackling the endemic corruption that is undermining the operational effectiveness of security services.
For its part, NATO specifically identified anti-corruption as a crucial aspect of its long-term SSR support to the Ukraine, where many believe corruption has played a significant role in undermining the Ukrainian army’s ability to deal with the separatist movement in the east. For instance, the Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission states, “With Allied support, including through the Annual National Programme, Ukraine remains committed to the implementation of wide-ranging reforms, to combat corruption and to promote an inclusive political process, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law.”
I recommend that security sector reform programs take into consideration the following areas to address corruption risk:
Holistic and politically sensitive engagement:
Addressing corruption cannot be a siloed and purely technical exercise. While support is necessary for building up institutions and training individuals to combat and mitigate corruption, political management is required. Combating corruption will create losers who previously benefited from nepotism, embezzlement, and payoffs. Programs need competent staff with diplomatic and mediation skills, well thought through risk maps and mitigation plans, and strong analysis as to how corruption networks operate in a local context. Security sector anti-corruption programs also need to take into account and complement national anti-corruption programs.
Corruption plays itself out differently in each context. Tools to help analyse corruption should include stakeholder, political-economy, and institutional integrity analyses. In addition, following the money is important. For instance, Bernard Harborne highlights case study assessments in Côte d’Ivoire and Somaliland where following security sector revenues uncovered significant corruption and threats to the sustainability of security sector financing.
Institution and procedure building
Procedures and standards that promote integrity and punish corruption need to be built up within security institutions. Achieving this includes security personnel identifying and prioritising their corruption risks, along with developing context specific plans that account for political challenges. Codes of conduct, procurement and career advancement processes, and legislation for whistleblowers need to be backed up with training, particularly amongst senior leadership, and oversight on their implementation.
Accountability for the use of state resources is crucial for combating corruption. The defence and security sectors pose two critical hurdles for accountability: 1) sensitive information; and 2) technical complexity. There will always be a need for some level of secrecy within the security sector, but tactics such as labeling budgets as ‘state secrets’ demonstrate how this need can be easily abused. A healthy balance between secrecy and disclosure needs to be struck with civilians weighing in on the decision. Those responsible for oversight also need to understand what they are examining, which may call for expert advice. Finally, effective oversight institutions need to be established and maintained such as anti-corruption bodies, which without support get targeted for budget cuts.
Civil society and citizen voices:
Speaking out against the security sector can often be regarded as taboo in post-conflict or authoritarian countries, notably due to the personal risks of doing so. When the public does speak out, the tendency leans to criticism without an articulation of the kind of the security sector the public wants. Support to combat corruption needs to help facilitate a dialogue between the public and the security sector to the point that this is the norm. This does not just mean ‘awareness raising’ about corruption. Most citizens are well aware of corruption problems. Rather it means helping the public and civil society to examine how corruption works, and what are ways of calling for accountability. Additionally, the free press needs to be empowered as an important part of civil society oversight.
Placing more emphasis in these prevention programs can do far more for local, regional, and global security in the long run than continuing to rely on train and equip programs.
Postscript: With the release of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index on December 4th, the rankings of the countries listed provides an indicator of the problems unrestricted arming programs can lead to. It wasn’t long before US arms shipments for Iraq – ranked 6th most corrupt country – found their way into ISIS hands.